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With significant equity incentives in its compensation structure, stock option 
expensing approval affects the compensation structure in the US high-tech 
industry. A large sample analysis shows that in response to FAS 123R in 2005, 
the proportion of options offered to CEOs and Top 5 Executives at high-tech 
firms has decreased, with significance. This in turn does not seem to change, 
significantly, risk-taking incentives, measured by vega, of CEOs and Top 5 
Executives in this industry.  
Following the same tendency, a small sample of 10 US high-tech companies 
presents that non-named executives and employees have suffered a decrease in 
options offerings from 2002 to 2006 accompanied by the introduction of restricted 
stock units (RSUs) and the introduction (in some cases) of a binomial option-
pricing model. Contradicting this tendency non-employee directors have seen an 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
With the intention of extending equity compensation studies for other 
influential industries, this dissertation focuses in the role of equity incentives – 
stock options – in US high-tech industry. The technology sector has not only 
revolutionized traditional business models since the internet boom in the 1990’s, 
but has also been linked to an interesting remuneration system aimed at creating a 
“bond” between the employee and the company with the use of equity – namely 
stock and stock options. Therefore, I intend to study how the introduction of a 
new regulation demanding stock options expensing – FAS 123R – affected the 
compensation structure in the high-tech industry and what potential consequences 
can it have to management’s risk-taking incentives. I will start by measuring the 
impact of FAS 123R on stock options offerings  and risk-taking incentives for 
CEOs and TOP 5 Executives to further extend the analysis to lower hierarchical 
levels in the sector.   
However before examining the influence of stock option in high-tech one has 
to frame the role of stock options in the overall compensation structure over the 
years. Generally, over the last decades one was able to witness remarkable 
changes over the usage of stock options has a compensation component to reward 
top executives. According to Murphy (2012), the 1990’s marked a time were 
stock-option usage more than tripled, boosting CEO pay of S&P 500 from 1990 to 
1999. However the beginning of the new century was accompanied by a decrease 
in executives overall pay not only in the US
1
 but also internationally, especially 
                                                 
1
 Fernandes et al. (2013)  
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during the economic crises of 2008-09. In addition, new regulatory measures
2
 not 
only slowed down the usage of stock options but also substituted it as a reward 
mechanism for restricted stock. Actually, several streams of literature have been 
focusing on the fact that companies used to perceive stock as a “free grant” with 
no expenses attached
3
. As Hall and Murphy (2003) argue, as a result of a 
favourable accounting treatment, companies used to perceive the cost of options 
to be lower than its economic cost. But the array of corporate accounting scandals 
since the 2000s, such as the Enron corporate scandal
4
 and the Worldcom internal 
auditing fraud
5
, call out to the attention of regulators for improved accounting 
measures. Similar to this issue, Carter et al. (2007) argues that the non-expensing 
of stock might be one of the reasons why CEO compensation has been increasing 
over the years. To reduce the public scrutiny surrounding options accounting 
treatment, FASB stated it would start considering a regulation demanding an 
accounting expense of stocks
6
 to have tangible implementation by early 2004. 
This proposition has since been supported by the International Accounting 
Standard Board
7
 that aims at expensing stock in international companies. The 
influence of the accounting impact implicit in this regulation change seems to be 
something that concerns not only practitioners but also researchers. Hayes et al. 
(2012) and Carter et al. (2007) share the same view that accounting represents a 
major influencer when it comes to the design of compensation contracts. As 
                                                 
2
 Details of regulation are described in Hall and Murphy (2003). 
3
 As stated in Hall and Murphy (2003). 
4
 For a more detailed overview of the major developments surrounding this case, more 
information can be found at: http://www.economist.com/node/940091 
5
 One of the major frauds in recent years with major implications for the auditing industry. 
Overview of this case at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2066731.stm 
6
 Detailed description of the regulation can be found at: 
http://www.fasb.org/news/nr073102.shtml 
7
 The IASB as always shown concern over fair value practices related to stock options 




Hayes et al. (2012) refer, companies foreseeing high damages in earnings arising 
from stock options expensing are expected to reduce more their option usage than 
other companies. This might lead one to question if companies that give major 
importance to option usage for increasing convexity will favour the accounting 
impact over risk-taking incentives. High-tech companies serve as a good example 
of this problematic, because they need to incentivise managers to take risks by 
disrupting with innovative products, but also, maintain their accounts sustainable.                
Considering the above mentioned, it would be interesting to understand how 
US companies in the technology sector, that rely heavily on stock options 
incentive plans to attract and retain key employees, reacted to this unfavourable 
accounting treatment. Additionally, it would be important to understand what are 
the implications of this measure on the level of convexity of compensations 
contracts measured by vega. This seems not only relevant for high-tech companies 
but also to the overall set of public corporations
8
.  How high-tech companies 
changed their equity compensation plans? Will the size of stock options be 
reduced in compensation contracts? Will stock options grants be granted to fewer 
employees? Will companies make an effort to maintain management risk-taking 
incentives measured by vega? These are all questions that seem worth exploring. 
 
  
                                                 
8
 By relying less in stock option grants, one would expect non-high-tech companies to be less 




In this dissertation I analyse the impact of FAS 123R on high-tech US 
companies at several hierarchical levels on a large sample using an ExecuComp 
dataset, from 2000 to 2007. Firstly, I put my focus on the consequences of FAS 
123R stock option offerings for CEOs and Top 5 Executives. I was able to 
understand that the proportion of options has diminished significantly on CEOs 
and Top 5 Executives at high-tech firms from 2005 onwards. The average CEO in 
a high-tech firm as suffered an incremental decrease of 10.7 percentage points in 
the proportion of options offered after 2005, comparing to all public companies in 
the sample period. Furthermore, by defining vega as my proxy for measuring risk-
taking incentives I recognize that CEOs and Top 5 Executives’ current and total 
vega for high-tech firms do not seem to be affected with significance by this 
regulation change. In contrast all other companies (excluding high-tech) in my 
sample have seen a decrease in CEO and Top 5 Executive’s current and total vega 
values. This fact – that contradicts my initial hypothesis – led me to a more 
qualitative research on proxy statements and annual reports of high-tech 
companies that would enable me to have a solid interpretation of these results. 
This made me hypothesize that to maintain risk-taking incentives (vega values) 
high-tech companies recurred to other compensation mechanisms that were 
creating similar incentives: restricted stock units and indexed stock options are 
among the most used alternatives.  
Finally, I decided to extend my analysis to lower hierarchical levels, with the 
objective of understanding if non-named executives and employees that still have 
a major influence at high-tech companies, have seen their level of stock options 
decrease. By constructing a small sample of 10 major US players in the high-tech 
10 
 
business, I realized that since 2005 companies have been reducing the amount of 
stock options they offer to non-employees. From this overall sample the number 
of options has decreased almost 52% from 695,721 to 361,165. Inclusively, 
foreseeing the negative effects of FAS 123R, some companies have excluded 
options from their compensation mechanisms. Also, it was perceptible that some 
companies in my sample have adopted a binomial option pricing model – instead 
of the Black-Scholes module – with the objective of reaching a better precision in 
valuing options, which is in accordance with FAS 123R principles. The last focus 
of my study goes to the changes in stock options offerings to non-employee 
directors, that apparently have seen their level of options increase within the 
2002-2006 period. A fact that contradicts the overall tendency of options usage 




Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction and basic concepts 
Agency theory predicts that managers, who are provided with indirect equity 
holdings, such as stock options, have greater incentives to improve the economic 
value of the firm (Larcker and Tayan, 2011). This concept relies on the 
underpinnings of the principal-agent agency problem where the principal cannot 
perfectly observe the agents actions giving rise to an ex-ante (adverse selection) or 
ex-post (moral hazard) asymmetric information issue. Also, measuring incentives 
provided by equity components has always been undermined by endogeneity 
issues. As Roberts et al. (2012) put it, the major implication related to 
endogeneity, is that it will bias any regression results, avoiding research to 
measure the real magnitude of the desired object of study. Nonetheless, stock 
options usage as a compensation component has always been a relevant topic in 
academia. And, when measuring incentives from stock options (or any other 
equity component) researchers focus their attention into two different dimensions 




2.1.1 Ownership and Convexity 
In estimating ownership arising from stock options, one has to weight the 
extent to which options are in or out of the money, which can be assessed using 
option delta – change in the value of stock option for an incremental change in the 
stock price. Incentives end up to be low when options are out-of-the-money and 
eventually comparable to that of stocks when in the money. Aiming to study the 
magnitude of several incentive mechanisms in compensation policy, Jensen and 
Murphy (1990)
9
 suggest a dollar-for-dollar measure for option delta closely 
associated to managerial percentage ownership
10
: change in CEO wealth per 
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth. According to them, the median pay-for-
performance sensitivity for stocks and stock options is $2.50 per $1,000 change in 
shareholder wealth. To a larger extent, the authors advocate that the pay-for-
performance sensitivity has been reduced since the 1930s translated into a CEO 
wealth change of $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholders wealth
11
. 
However, Hall and Liebman (1998)
12
 argue that not only Jensen and Murphy’s 
measures rely on a time horizon associated with the burst of stock options 
issuance, but also that they focus entirely on CEO wealth changes relative to firm 
value. So, they propose an alternative way to account for option delta that takes 
into account the dollar change in option value with respect to a 1% change in 
stock price. Although they agree that pay-performance sensitivity is majorly 
driven by changes in the value of stock and stock options – according to them 
                                                 
9
 Jensen and Murphy (1990) study composes Executive Compensation Surveys published by 
Forbes between 1974 and 1986, comprising a total of 1,688 executives from 1,068 firms.  
10
 Managerial percentage ownership usually refers to the effective CEO ownership that arises 
from stock, restricted stock and stock options.  
11
 The authors justify this reduction in sensibility by hypothesizing that public and private 
forces might impose constrains to reduce pay-for-performance sensibility.  
12
 Hall and Liebman (1998) analyses runs from 1980 to 1994 and agglomerates CEO 
compensation from proxy statements and 10-K files.   
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stock and stock options revaluations rise median CEO wealth by $1.5 million for a 
10% increase in firm value for US firms – they oppose to Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) reflection, arguing that CEO compensation and pay-for-performance 
sensitivity has increased from 1980-1994. To sustain their point they segment 
firms into percentiles according with their stock performance and explain that 
total compensation for the median CEO is $1 million if the companies’ stock has a 
“thirtieth percentile annual return (- 7.0 percent) and is $5 million if the firm’s 
stock has a seventieth percentile annual return (20.5 percent)”. This shows a great 
difference in pay between poor performing and good performing companies, 
indicating great sensibility in the pay-for-performance relation.     
Although the slope of the wealth-performance relation – option delta – 
provides guidance in aligning incentives of managers with those of shareholders, a 
higher delta might expose managers to too much firm risk. This gives place to the 
two side-effect of the performance-based pay, arising from the risk-related agency 
problem: the wealth effect that aligns managers’ incentives with the interests of 
shareholders, versus, the risk-aversion effect arising from an increased delta that 
exposes risk-averse managers to more risk.  As documented by Smith and Stulz 
(1985), risk-averse managers might avoid risky, positive net present value projects 
because they have much of their wealth tied to the firm. May (1995) goes even 
further and presents empirical findings consistent with the fact that managers with 
“large stock holdings undertake risk-reducing acquisitions”. This is when 
convexity “plays its role” in mitigating risk related agency problems arising from 
delta. Convexity denoted in the wealth-performance relation assesses the 
sensitivity of managers’ wealth to the volatility of stock price and is majorly 
measured through option vega: value of managers’ stock options for a given 
14 
 
change in stock-return volatility. By measuring vega of options, “as the Black-
Scholes partial derivative of option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock 
return volatility” Guay (1999) documents that stock options significantly 
influence the increase in convexity in CEO’s equity-based pay. The author’s 
results are even complacent with the fact that companies are willing to introduce 
more convexity in compensation contracts when they know beforehand that the 
downside of underinvestment by a risk-averse agent is too large (situation that is 
likely to occur for companies that have substantial investment opportunities). This 
association study – and not causal effect – motivated further research over the 
determinants of vega in an attempt to establish a causal relation between vega and 
corporate policies.  
2.2 Causality in vega-firm risk relation 
Establishing the direction of causality on the vega-firm risk relation as 
always proved to be a problem for research, mainly attributed to endogeneity 
concerns. This works the same when trying to measure the effects of vega on 
corporate policies or risk, which leads to the question if there is any “underlying 
and omitted primitive factor” that determines the association between vega and 
equity risk. By controlling for CEO delta and using refined modelling and 
econometric empirical methods to control for endogenous issues, Coles et al. 
(2006) make an effort to go further in research and establish causality between 
vega and corporate policies. By hypothesizing that higher vega values must result 
in higher R&D spending, less capital expenditures, decreased diversification and 
higher leverage, the authors claim to have discovered that a high vega leads to the 
implementation of riskier policy choices. Fact that leads to the general overview 
that a higher sensitivity to stock price volatility associated to CEO compensation 
15 
 
schemes incentivises managers to pursue riskier policy choices. Moreover, in an 
effort to extend risk-taking causality analysis to other corporate roles, Chava and 
Purnanandam (2010) centre their study in CEOs and CFOs different reactions 
towards financial polices when exposed to different risk-taking incentives. The 
study explains that CEOs risk incentives are associated with leverage and cash 
balances while CFOs risk motivations relate more to debt-maturity and “earnings 
smoothing throw accounting accruals”. It is worth to mention, that the authors 
come up with a different approach to establish causality by exploiting the 
accounting standard SFAS 123 (R) that demands stock options expensing (which 
made options a less attractive remuneration tool). Still, since all companies get 
affected by this regulation it becomes difficult to create a control group that would 
track the normal course of events and make it possible to establish a difference-in-
difference analysis. Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that stock options 
influence significantly convexity levels in compensation contracts. Also as 
Hemmer et al. (1990) state, it seems optimal to increase convexity in manager’s 




2.3 Risk-taking incentives in banks  
Given the importance of risk-taking incentives in manager’s actions, several 
streams of literature were devoted to narrow down this topic and understand how 
key institutions with major socio-economic roles, such as banks, behave. Risk 
taking incentives in banks reveals itself as an interesting topic of research due to 
the role that deposit insurances perform as a self-guard mechanism for depositor’s 
savings. By reducing incentives to “run to the bank” in case of financial trouble, 
depositors lose as well their interest in monitoring banks activities giving rise to a 
moral hazard problem. Bank shareholders are then incentivised to shift risk from 
the bank to the deposit insurance agency by changing the incentives mechanism 
given to their top executives. One can actually see the issue as deposit insurances 
being a put option of shareholders intended to sell the banks’ assets to the deposit 
insurance entity. Thus, literature devoted to explain the mechanics behind 
compensation policies in banks is mainly surrounding two main theories: the 
moral hazard hypothesis stating that compensation policies in banks encourages 
risk taking in order to maximize the put option value embedded on fixed rate 
deposit insurances; and the contracting hypothesis that defends compensation 
policies are just the mere reflection in firm’s investment opportunities set. Based 
on these opposing views Houston and James (1995) devoted themselves to 
understand if the level and structure of pay for CEOs in banks is different from 
industrial firms. According to them banks seem to have a lower market-to-book 
ratio reflecting that investment opportunities are smaller in banks as this is a 
heavily regulated industry. Comparing with non-banks, banks present a lower 
market value of CEO stock holdings, option holdings and value of options granted 
per year. This appears to offer support for the contracting hypothesis claiming that 
17 
 
due to banking regulation limits the investment opportunity set decreases, leading 
to less need for incentive-based compensation. Also, by controlling for firm size, 
risk characteristics and bank charter value of 134 commercial banks, the authors’ 
results present more alignment with the contracting hypothesis. They observe a 
positive relation between CEO total stock outstanding and market-to-book, 
supporting the view that higher growth opportunities lead to higher ownership, 
and vice-versa. In addition, there seems to be no evidence that banks that appear 
to be “too-big-to-fail”
13
 receive more equity incentives. Which overall, may lead 
one to conclude that compensation in banks, although different, it does not 
incentivize CEOs to take excessive risks. Similar to this problematic John and 
Qian (2003) devoted themselves to understand if CEO compensation in banks was 
different from that in manufacturing firms. Based on the fact that banks are 
regulated, highly leveraged and have a deposit insurance mechanism, they 
compare pay-performance sensitivities in banks with the sensitivity in 
manufacturing companies. Using the Jensen and Murphy (1990) measure of dollar 
change in CEO compensation per $1,000 dollar change in shareholder value these 
researchers conclude that pay-for-performance sensitivity is lower in banks 
comparing with manufacturing companies. After regressing direct and firm-
related wealth changes towards size, risk and debt ratio, John and Qian (2003) 
conclude that debt ratios have a significant impact in reducing the pay-
performance sensitivity. Although the authors attribute the lower sensitivity to 
leverage, prior findings of Hirschey and Pappas (1981) or Carroll and Ciscel 
(1982) attribute also some responsibility to the lower pay-for-performance 
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 In this study the term “too-big-to-fail” is meant to refer to banks that have such a huge 
weight in the overall economy, making regulators believe that any governing body would try to 
avoid their collapse and prevent bankruptcy.    
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sensitivity in banks due to the role of regulation. Regulation can serve as 
substitute mechanism for monitoring top executives actions, which consequently 
may lower pay-performance sensitivity. Also, if one considers that large banks are 
usually monitored by several investment analysts, this can actually contribute to 
increase transparency levels compared to other industries. On the other hand, 
despite all regulatory measures, banks have been the target of public scrutiny as a 
consequence of the latest financial crises. Major financial institutions were 
struggling to survive financial distress periods while being overwhelmed with 
some corporate scandals violating banks regulation. This fact has called the 
attention of researchers and practitioners that question themselves if top 
executives in banking were receiving the right incentives. Some critics defend that 
one of the major causes was related to the poor long-term incentives put in place 
for top executives. The excessive bonus plans, for example, made bank CEOs to 
focus only on short-term performance indicators in detriment to long-term 
sustainability. Also, stock option plans recalled the previous moral hazard 
hypothesis by taking the blame of incentivizing CEOs to increase call option 
values of equity to a less than optimal scenario. Despite that, it is still reasonable 
to assume that overall equity incentives would make CEOs focus on the long-
term. Following this line of thought, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) became 
interested in understanding if bank performance throughout the financial crises 
had something to do with the incentives being provided by shareholders before the 
crisis. The focus is not in the size of compensation but on the incentives effect of 
the compensation. In their sample of S&P ExecuComp 95 bank holding 
companies and investment banks it is perceptible that the majority of CEO 
compensation comes from performance-based pay. The value of the equity 
19 
 
portfolio is in fact more important to CEOs comparing to non-executives that 
value more cash bonus awards. Hence it would be expected that CEOs with better 
incentive alignment – meaning more wealth tied to the firm – would take less 
risky investments once they had more to loss. And by risking less it could be that 
better performance would be expected in the future, especially in financial distress 
periods. Opposing to this view the authors actually state that banks with better 
incentive alignment perform worst during the financial crisis. Along with 
decreases in performance it appears that CEOs have suffered great losses on their 
overall wealth, with some of them increasing their percentage holdings right 




2.4 FAS 123 R conceptual framework  
Equity-based compensation accounting regulation dates as late as 1972 when 
the Accounting Principles Board (APB) issued APB Option 25. This piece of 
regulation stated that stock-based compensation should be recorded at its intrinsic 
value. By intrinsic value one refers to the difference between the market price of 
the stock and its exercise price. Also, APB 25 only demanded the expense of 
stock compensation if the exercise price was less than the existent price at the 
grant date (the date where the exercise price and the number of shares are known). 
However, in 1993 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) – the 
successor of APB – emitted a draft requiring companies to state the value of 
stock-option grants granted to employees as a compensation expense in the year 
the grant was made. This urged a round of protest from some industries – 
especially from the high-tech sector – that were granting large amounts of stocks 
options and feared a downturn on performance indicators with the reduction of 
earnings. With this concern in mind FASB issued a final regulation, FAS 123, that 
although was appealing companies to expense stock option grants, it was allowing 
them to use APB 25 as a reporting reference. Thus, between 1995 and 2005, 
companies were reporting equity-based compensation under FAS 123 having the 
option to expense (or not) stock-option grants.  
Everything appeared to be stable when FASB decided to challenge the status 
quo and released an amended version of FAS 123 in 2004. This revision, named 
FAS 123R, forced companies to comply with the principal of fair value 
accounting in the Income Statement. Meaning that from June 15, 2005
14
, all 
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 Later on this date was revised for January 2006 following the polemics created by this rule 
in certain industries. 
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public companies – that do not file as a small business issuer – were obliged to 
expense stock-options at fair value. The major implication of this was that, before 
FAS 123R firms were allowed to expense stock options at its intrinsic value. 
Considering most companies grant their options “at the money”, firms ended up 
not recognising any expenses for option-based compensations in its annual 
reports. This (favourable) accounting treatment represented a major advantage for 
companies, especially if they attribute more value to the perceived cost of options 
than to its economic cost. In fact, Hall and Murphy (2003) argue that this practice 
makes the perceived cost of options to be lower than their economic cost. 
However, after 2005, FAS 123R mandated that all stock options must be expensed 
at fair value. Now, stock options are measured by fair value resulting in a 
compensation expense in the Income Statement. So, if firms give more value to 
the perceived cost (instead of economic cost) of options, they will presumably 
change their incentive plans and executive compensation packages to offset the 
disadvantages of stock options accounting treatments
15
. If one considers that the 
high-tech sector is mainly characterized by offering substantial equity awards – 
mainly stock and stock option – to retain key employees, FAS 123R will have a 
major impact on this sector’s activity. Not only in reformulating its compensation 
structure but also in maintaining convexity in compensation contracts with options 
offerings. Therefore, Chapter 3 and 4 will focus on the influence of FAS 123R in 
stock options usage and major implications in risk-taking incentives for all public 
firms with major focus in high-tech companies at several hierarchical levels: 
CEO; Top 5 Executives; Non-executive employees; Non-Employee Directors.   
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 In relation to other equity forms of compensation they were not so majorly affected by 
FAS 123R. Restricted Stock, for example, is essentially viewed “as a fixed option with an exercise 
price of zero” (Hayes et al. 2012), so its accounting treatment is its fair value at the grant-date. 
Additionally, although equity awards and long-term equity incentives awards has suffered slighter 
changes it did not have the same impact compared to stock options. 
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Chapter 3 – Large Sample Analysis 
3.1 Introduction, data and summary statistics 
I use the ExecuComp database as my source to calculate CEO and Top 5 
Executives
16
 compensation separately. This dataset contains compensation 
information from fiscal year 2000 to 2012. My panel data analysis measures 
changes in compensation structure from 2000 through 2007. FAS 123R became 
mandatory for all public entities – that do not file as a small business issuers – at 
June 15, 2005
17
. I decide to define the post-FAS 123R period as January 2006 to 
December 2007, with my pre- period being from January 2000 to December 2005. 
This will allow me to capture the real effect of this measure after the adjustment 
period that companies had to pass by in 2005. Although there were some early 
adopters
18
 already implementing this procedure in their reports, I strongly believe 
they are a small minority that will not influence final results. In addition, my 
intention is to establish the strongest relation possible between the ruling 
introduction, changes in options grating and consequently changes in vega. 
Extending my analysis further than 2007 could undermine the overall regression 
analysis, considering the financial crisis period that follows. Dodd-Frank Act 
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 My variable for Top 5 Executives was created by sorting the data by total compensation 
and generating a dummy variable that would assemble a number for 1 to 5, excluding the CEO, for 
the 5 highest paid executives in each firm. 
17
 It is worth mention that although the general rule was June, 2005 several exceptions were 
opened and FAS 123R became completely mandatory for some companies in January 2006. 
18
 Some companies were already expensing stock options in their accounts to mitigate the 
abrupt change in performance indicators in 2006. Microsoft, for example, started as early as 2003. 
However, it is worth mention that including 2005 in the post-FAS 123R period does not change 
the magnitude of my results. Also, Warren Buffet was a major proponent of this law approval. So 
basically all the companies he was the major stockholder of companies where he was serving at 
the board of directors started the early adoption of FAS 123R. The Coca Cola Company, The New 
York Times, The Washington Post (owned by Graham Holdings Company) are some of the most 





 combined with other legislation, introduced several changes around 
executive compensation that make it more difficult to extract the real effect of 
FAS 123R on high-tech or any other company. Also, I require that all firms have 
at least one year of data in the pre- and post-FAS 123R period. In resemblance to 
Hayes et al. (2012), I exclude financial firms – with standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code from 6000 to 6999 – and utility firms – with SIC code 
from 4900 to 4999. These firms operate in a quite specific market environment, 
abiding to detailed regulation and restrictions that influences their overall 
behaviour. As Fama and French (1992) put it, financial firms, for example, have 
high leverage ratios which are considered normal for the industry, but might be 
interpreted as financial distress comparing with other activities. So, excluding 
them seems to be a better option for the sake of results interpretation.  
Moving on to qualitative characteristics of the data it is worth mention one 
detail. All of the data collected – for the proportion of salary, bonus, grants of 
stock options, grants of restricted stock and long-term incentive awards – does not 
take into consideration further changes in reporting requirements implemented by 
SEC within this period. In contrast to Hayes et al. (2012) I do not incorporate new 
disclosure rules that end up redefining some compensation components as the 
case of bonus
20
. Because I take for granted the assurance of consistency in 
                                                 
19
 The Dodd-Frank was signed in July 2010 by President Barack Obama and is majorly 
aimed at regulating financial market in an attempt to avoid another financial crisis similar to the 
one started in 2008. The introduction of a new independent organization to protect consumers, the 
extinction of the Too big to fail rule, the introduction of rules to protect investors such as “say on 
pay” and the introduction of tougher rules for transparency and accountability are among some of 
the new measures brought up by this act (www. 
http://www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/doddfrankact/index.htm).     
20
 Hayes et al. (2012) mention new disclosure rules end up reclassifying some bonuses as 
non-equity incentives compensation, which changes the way this component is accounted for 
proxy statements.     
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measurements across time, I believe that changes within this period will not affect 
my main variables of study: option grants and vega.  
Besides the compensation components for the CEO and Top 5 Executives I 
present summary statistics for high-tech firms, extracted with Compustat from 
2000 to 2007. Market-to-book (MTB) is computed as the market value of equity 
plus total liabilities (TL), divided by total assets (TA). Research and development 
(RD) is deflated by Total Assets (RD/TA) and capital expenditures (CAPEX) is 
deflated by total assets (CAPEX/TA). Size is the logarithm of total assets and 
tenure represents the years the CEO is on the job.  
I merge both the ExecuComp data with Compustat for the CEO in one file 
and similar to that for the Top 5 Executives in a separate file. In both merged files 
I create a dummy variable to segment the data for high-tech (High_tech) 
companies. High-tech companies are defined using the Fama and French 
classification of 48 industry groups, taking the value of 1 if the firm is operating 
in an industry with a four-digit SIC code equal to: 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 
3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372 or 7373.  
The full sample for the CEO and Top 5 Executives, for high-tech companies 
is presented in Table 1. Details about the calculation of the proportion of each 
compensation component are presented in Appendix A. I follow previous 
literature (Guay, 1999; Coles et al. 2006) to compute the sensitivities of annual 
compensation to changes in stock price expressed by vega. Thus, current vega 
(VegaC_opt) is calculated as the change in value of CEO or Top 5 Executives’ 
annual equity-based compensation for a 0.01 change in stock price volatility. 
Similarly, I compute the sensitivities for the CEO and Top 5 Executives’ total 
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portfolio of current and outstanding prior grants of shares and options, expressed 
by Vega_tot. Detailed description about these variables follows in Appendix A, as 
well.  
Table 1 states summary statistics from 2000-07 in high-tech firms. Firstly, I 
present statistics regarding the fraction of total compensation arising from each 
pay element. On average, stock represents the biggest proportional component 
(P_option) of compensation packages for CEOs in high-tech firms – 45.8 % of 
total compensation. The same is true for Top 5 Executives with 39.4% of stock 
options, on average
21
. In relation to incentive measures, namely vega
22
 both 
current and total vega present higher values for CEOs in high-tech, comparing 
with Top 5 Executives. For example, a 0.01 change in stock return volatility 
implies an average change in CEO current stock option value of $46,035 
comparing with $14,418 for the Top 5 Executives. Being the CEO offered more 
stock options it would be reasonably expected higher sensitivity. Assuming as 
well that the CEO is responsible for taking major corporate decisions in a firm it 
is expected a higher pay-for-performance sensibility attached to this role, in the 
hopes of avoiding deviations from optimal performance levels. However, there is 
an important detail there is worth mention: vega values seem to present significant 
higher values for the average when compared to the median for CEOs and Top 5 
Executives. For example, VegaC_opt for a CEO in a high-tech company is 
$46,035 on average when compared to $10,783 for the median. This indicates that 
the distribution is positively skewed.               
                                                 
21
 Although the proportion of salary it is quite close to the same level with Top 5 Executives 
receiving 37.9% of its compensation in salary.  
22
 Values expressed in thousands of dollars. 
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Table 1 – Summary statistics, all sample years (2000-07) 
Variable N Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
 
Variable N Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
For CEO in High-Tech 
 
For Top 5 Executives in High-Tech 
Percentage of CEO compensation 
 
Percentage of Top 5 Executives compensation 
P_salary 1526 0.317 0.309 0.091 0.191 0.439 
 
P_salary 6920 0.379 0.292 0.147 0.292 0.559 
P_bonus 1526 0.119 0.174 0 0.046 0.172 
 
P_bonus 6920 0.127 0.165 0 0.068 0.189 
P_option 1526 0.458 0.355 0 0.518 0.782 
 
P_option 6920 0.394 0.331 0 0.410 0.683 
P_RS 1526 0.097 0.221 0 0 0 
 
P_RS 6920 0.093 0.203 0 0 0 
P_LTIP 1526 0.009 0.061 0 0 0 
 
P_LTIP 6920 0.007 0.055 0 0 0 
Vega values (thousands of dollars) 
 
Vega values (thousands of dollars) 
VegaC_opt 1531 46.035 156.037 0 10.783 40.291 
 
VegaC_opt 6922 14.418 49.331 0 3.350 11.550 
Vega_tot 1531 237.478 535.181 21.202 68.963 226.652 
 
Vega_tot 6922 60.140 150.241 4.882 17.547 49.501 
         
Num_Option_c 
(thousands) 








Size 1531 6.985 1.697 5.758 6.793 7.900 
 
Size 6922 7.042 1.680 5.811 6.838 7.944 
RD/TA 1531 0.090 0.084 0.034 0.081 0.132 
 
RD/TA 6922 0.089 0.079 0.034 0.081 0.131 
MTB 1520 2.653 2.482 1.383 2.000 3.135 
 
MTB 6873 2.664 2.536 1.386 2.001 3.137 
CAPEX/TA 1525 0.041 0.039 0.015 0.027 0.052 
 
CAPEX/TA 6897 0.041 0.039 0.015 0.028 0.053 
ROA 1527 0.091 0.154 0.045 0.108 0.162 
 
ROA 6902 0.093 0.147 0.046 0.108 0.162 
Notes. Summary Statistics for CEO and Top 5 Executives in high-tech firms over the entire sample period. The sample contains observation from 2000 through 2007. Details about the 
construction of the percentage variables of each compensation component and definition of sensitivity measures of pay are presented in Appendix A. Size is the logarithmic value of 
total assets; RD/TA is R&D expenses deducted by total assets; MTB is the Market-to-book value; CAPEX/TA is CAPEX deducted by total assets; ROA refers to Return on Assets. 
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for the pre- and post-FAS 123R periods 
for the CEO in high-tech companies. On average, the proportion of options 
(P_options) for the CEO in high-tech firms seems to have diminished expressively 
– from 51.4% to 29.5%. The proportion of salary (P_salary) and restricted stock 
(P_RS) increased for the CEO in the post- FAS123R period, especially P_RS: 
from 4.3% to 25.7%. This might be an indication that foreseeing the accounting 
impact associated with options, high-tech companies decided to substitute options 
for other pay components. Also, median current vega has decreased for CEOs in 
high-tech, in the post-FAS 123R: the median CEO in an high-tech decreased 
current vega (VegaC_opt) by half from $12,330 to $6,402 as of a 0.01 change in 
stock return volatility. Considering that options are the major component in 
compensation that increases convexity, measured by vega, it would be reasonably 
expected that with the reduction of option usage vega values would decrease.  In 
contrast, total vega (Vega_tot) for CEOs seems to have increased on median, but 
decreased on the average. What seems to be relevant, as well, it is the number of 
options granted (Num_opt_share_c) before and after FAS 123R for this industry. 
On average, the number of options granted to CEOs in high-tech decreased from 
3,538 to 1,777. This reduction acts in favour of Hayes et al. (2012) argument 
stating that companies foreseeing a big accounting impact with the use of stock 
drove compensation to other components.   
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Table 2 – Summary statistics pre- and post- period CEO (2000-07) 
Pre-FAS 123R period 
 
Post-FAS 123R period 
Variable N Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
 
Variable N Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
For CEO in High-Tech 
 
For CEO in High-Tech 
Percentage of CEO compensation 
 
Percentage of CEO compensation 
P_salary 1140 0.294 0.300 0.078 0.174 0.403 
 
P_salary 386 0.384 0.324 0.133 0.259 0.527 
P_bonus 1140 0.139 0.179 0 0.072 0.200 
 
P_bonus 386 0.059 0.145 0 0 0.023 
P_option 1140 0.514 0.353 0.063 0.604 0.832 
 
P_option 386 0.295 0.308 0 0.215 0.555 
P_RS 1140 0.043 0.137 0 0 0 
 
P_RS 386 0.257 0.321 0 0 0.524 
P_LTIP 1140 0.010 0.066 0 0 0 
 
P_LTIP 386 0.005 0.046 0 0 0 
Vega (thousands of dollars) 
 
Vega (thousands of dollars) 
VegaC_opt 1143 50.149 168.110 0.185 12.330 46.087 
 
VegaC_opt 388 33.914 112.538 0 6.402 26.963 
Vega_tot 1143 238.575 560.910 19.349 64.096 222.379 
 
Vega_tot 388 234.246 451.581 31.102 82.372 228.500 
               
Num_Option_c 
(thousands) 








Size 1143 6.912 1.680 5.652 6.711 7.825 
 
Size 388 7.200 1.730 6.054 6.994 8.126 
RD/TA 1143 0.090 0.076 0.034 0.083 0.131 
 
RD/TA 388 0.091 0.106 0.028 0.079 0.133 
MTB 1136 2.771 2.727 1.388 2.041 3.288 
 
MTB 384 2.305 1.492 1.366 1.907 2.854 
CAPEX/TA 1137 0.043 0.041 0.016 0.028 0.056 
 
CAPEX/TA 388 0.034 0.031 0.013 0.023 0.045 
ROA 1139 0.091 0.145 0.040 0.108 0.164 
 
ROA 388 0.093 0.178 0.053 0.107 0.157 
Notes.   Pre- and Post- FAS 123R period for CEOs in high-tech companies.  Pre-FAS 123R, is from January 2000 to December 2005. Post-FAS 123R period is defined as January, 2006 
to December 2007. Details about percentage variables compensation components and definition of sensitivity measures of pay are presented in Appendix A. Size is the logarithmic 
value of total assets; RD/TA is R&D deducted by total assets; MTB is the Market-to-book value; CAPEX/TA is CAPEX deducted by total assets; ROA, Return on Assets. 
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Table 3 presents summary statistics for the pre- and post- FAS 123R periods 
for the Top 5 Executives in high-tech. The median Top 5 Executives in high-tech 
firms suffered a substantial reduction in P_option they were receiving – from 
43.9% to 25.9% in the post-period. In resemblance to CEOs, except from bonus 
(P_bonus) and long-term incentive plans (P_LTIP) all the components of pay 
have increased in the post- period. The increase in the level of restricted stock 
(P_RS), on average, seems to be quite relevant: from 4.5% to 23.6%. Top 5 
Executives vega values appear to remain stable with no major changes in both 
periods with a slight increase for current vega (VegaC_opt). Despite the fact that 
the number of options (Num_Option_c) granted in both the pre- and post- period 
as changed substantially: from 1,156 to 572.  
Overall, there is reason to believe FAS 123R introduced some changes to the 
structure of compensation contracts. This might indicate that companies are quite 
reactive to regulation that might impact accounting numbers. Specially, when the 
foreseeable accounting impact is expected to be high (Hayes et al. 2012). Which 
is the case for high-tech companies. Additionally, as one can realize the CEO is 
not the only one who gets majorly impacted by these changes. Top 5 Executives 
see their compensation changing as well. Also, regarding firm characteristics it 
appears no major changes occurred in this period influenced by FAS 123R. MTB 
ratio diminished slightly, on average. CAPEX/TA, ROA and RD expenses 




Table 3 - Summary statistics pre- and post- period Top 5 Executives (2000-07) 
Pre-FAS 123R period   Post-FAS 123R period 
Variable N Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
 
Variable N Mean Sd p25 p50 p75 
For Top 5 Executives in High-Tech 
 
For Top 5 Executives in High-Tech 
Percentage of Top 5 Executives compensation 
 
Percentage of Top 5 Executives compensation 
P_salary 5183 0.359 0.285 0.136 0.268 0.533 
 
P_salary 1737 0.439 0.303 0.193 0.367 0.622 
P_bonus 5183 0.149 0.169 0.016 0.095 0.216 
 
P_bonus 1737 0.063 0.135 0 0 0.059 
P_option 5183 0.439 0.337 0 0.487 0.733 
 
P_option 1737 0.259 0.273 0 0.194 0.455 
P_RS 5183 0.045 0.135 0 0 0 
 
P_RS 1737 0.236 0.287 0 0.055 0.463 
P_LTIP 5183 0.009 0.060 0 0 0 
 
P_LTIP 1737 0.004 0.036 0 0 0 
Vega values (thousands of dollars) 
 
Vega values (thousands of dollars) 
VegaC_opt 5183 15.321 52.847 0 3.712 12.267 
 
VegaC_opt 1739 11.729 36.802 0 2.456 9.272 
Vega_tot 5183 60.117 153.179 4.293 16.469 48.832 
 
Vega_tot 1739 60.208 141.165 6.596 20.256 52.363 
               Num_Option_c 
(thousands) 








Size 5183 6.975 1.667 5.752 6.773 7.872 
 
Size 1739 7.24 1.705 6.096 7.013 8.191 
RD/TA 5183 0.089 0.075 0.035 0.083 0.131 
 
RD/TA 1739 0.088 0.090 0.026 0.077 0.132 
MTB 5152 2.789 2.793 1.403 2.044 3.302 
 
MTB 1721 2.291 1.464 1.363 1.912 2.820 
CAPEX/TA 5158 0.043 0.041 0.016 0.029 0.057 
 
CAPEX/TA 1739 0.034 0.031 0.013 0.024 0.046 
ROA 5163 0.092 0.145 0.042 0.108 0.164 
 
ROA 1739 0.096 0.153 0.054 0.107 0.156 
Notes. Pre- and Post- FAS 123R period for the Top 5 Executives in High-Tech firms. .  Pre-FAS 123R, is from January 2000 to December 2005. Post-FAS 123R period is defined as 
January, 2006 to December 2007. Details about percentage variables compensation components and definition of sensitivity measures of pay are presented in Appendix A. Size is the 
logarithmic value of total assets; RD/TA is R&D deducted by total assets; MTB is the Market-to-book value; CAPEX/TA is CAPEX deducted by total assets; ROA is Return on Assets. 
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3.2 Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Post- FAS 123R and stock option usage 
Stock option offerings are the major ignition of convexity in 
compensation contracts. Convexity plays a role in managers’ daily lives 
because it gives the right incentives to maintain firm risk when deciding on 
financial and investment policies. Thus, by offering options to managers, 
shareholders try to mitigate to wealth-firm risk agency problem, 
incentivising management to pursue positive NPV risky projects. This fact, 
gains even more relevance if we consider that opposing to shareholders, 
managers are risk-averse undiversified individuals, who have the possibility 
of changing firm risk with their investment policy choices. It is empirically 
proven that management teams might be willing to forgo positive NPV 
projects if the costs to increase firm risk seem higher than the potential 
benefits arising from firm value. As Amihud and Lev (1981) state, risk-
averse managers are likely to pursue less than optimal firm risk with the 
objective of protecting their own “firm-specific human capital”.  
Therefore, the approval of FAS 123R favouring fair-value expensing of 
stock options, is seen as a negative aspect among shareholders for offering 
options to managers. Especially, if companies attribute more value to the 
perceived cost of options than to their economic cost has argued by Hall and 
Murphy (2003). This might have led shareholders to decrease the proportion 
of options offered to the CEO. Consequently, it seems relevant to 
understand the impact of this measure in lower levels of the hierarchical 
structure, namely the Top 5 Executives in the firm, excluding the CEO. 
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Furthermore, changes might have been even more severe in industries where 
stock option usage stands out as a major compensation component such as 
in the high-tech industry. Because, as Hayes et al. (2012) demonstrate, the 
decline in option usage with FAS 123R is higher for companies that would 
face higher account charges. Although firms are aware of the benefits of 
option usage in contracts, they give great important to the accounting impact 
of the regulation. Therefore, my main hypothesis is divided into two parts:  
Hypothesis 1A: The changes in accounting treatment proposed by FAS 
123R are associated with a decrease of stock options usage after 2005 for 
the CEO and Top 5 Executives in public listed companies in the US. 
Hypothesis 1B: The reduction in stock options usage, for CEO and 
Top 5 Executives, associated with the post-FAS 123R period will be higher 




3.2.2 Stock option usage and risk-taking behaviour 
As Smith and Stulz (1985) formalize, equity incentives in the form of 
stock options can increase managerial risk-taking “because increases in 
stock return volatility increase the value of the options”. But, one must 
consider the dual side effect of equity-based incentives. It is a fact that more 
equity in contracts helps to incentive the manager to take more risks and 
reach an optimal performance level. However, equity translates as well in 
more sensitivity of the manager’s portfolio to movements in the stock price 
of companies, which in turn might not be translated into more risk-taking 
(Hirshleifer and Suh 1992). This is the reason why, empirical researchers 
separate their analysis between the sensitivity of manager’s wealth to stock 
price, measured by delta, and the sensitivity of manager’s wealth to stock 
return volatility, measured by vega.  
This dissertation analyses the implications of FAS 123R for high-tech 
companies in managers risk-taking incentives, measured by vega. As Guay 
(1999) and Hayes et al. (2012) have shown, vega maintains a positive 
relation with the use stock options. In fact, companies such as high-tech 
offer their management great amounts of stock options in the hopes of 
incentivising risk-taking translated into high vega values. High-tech 
companies are more avid to take risk and pursue innovative and challenging 
projects in the hopes of reaching a great business idea. Both the CEO and 
Top 5 Executives are then incentivised to pursue risky projects and their 
compensation contracts reflect the importance in maintaining vega value at 
high levels. Considering the above stated, I analyse if high-tech companies 
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will be able to maintain vega values after FAS 123R introduction. And what 
is the impact of this regulation in vega.   
Based on the argument of Hayes et al. (2012) that companies facing 
more accounting charges are more inclined to reduce their option offering I 
hypothesize that vega will be more impacted in high-tech comparing with 
other public firms. This leads to my second hypothesis that is divided into 2 
parts: 
Hypothesis 2A – After 2005, there will be a decrease in managers’ 
risk-taking incentives, measured by vega, for the CEO and Top 5 Executives 
in public listed companies in the US. 
Hypothesis 2B – The incremental decrease in managers’ risk-taking 
incentives (measured by vega) will be higher for the CEO and Top 5 
Executives in high-tech companies, comparing with other firms, since the 
decline in option usage is more pronounced in firms that potentially face 





All the tests performed have in consideration the hypothesis developed 
in the previous chapter. To extract the real effect caused by this exogenous 
shock and avoid endogeneity issues Appendix C explains why to perform a 
firm fixed effects regressions that “control for any time-invariant 
heterogeneity across firms” (Hayes et al. 2012). The use of control variables 
in my regression analysis is intend to rule out the effect of predictive 
variables on my dependent variable and to check whether the effect of these 
control variables is in fact significant. Thus, by holding a set of variables 
constant, I isolate the effect of FAS 123R in an attempt to attribute more 




3.3.1 Changes in CEO and Top 5 Executives stock options  
I begin by examining how options offerings to the CEO and Top 5 
Executives was affected by the introduction of FAS 123R. I use a regression 
analysis that separately presents results for the CEO and Top 5 Executives. 
This regression has P_option as the dependent variable and a series of 
dummy and control variables.  
Controlling for firm size becomes important since different companies 
with different size are expected to offer different amounts of stock to their 
executives. The sign of the relation between option offerings and size might 
be uncertain. There is the view that larger companies, usually facing more 
monitoring costs, are expected to offer more options to their employees with 
the aim of providing the right incentives. Core and Guay (2001) observe that 
companies with bigger size and more decentralized structure are expected to 
offer more equity incentives as a consequence of higher direct monitoring 
costs.  Additionally, it is fair to say that larger companies enjoy more tax 
benefits
23
 by issuing and granting stocks to their employees
24
. Comparing 
with smaller firms one could argue that larger companies have more 
incentives to maintain their proportion of options offered, despite the 
upcoming unfavourable treatments. On the other hand, if we consider that 
larger companies offer more options they would consequently face higher 
accounting expenses in the event of FAS 123R approval. This can actually 
                                                 
23
 Apple, for example, realized $3.19 billion in tax savings from stock options 
issuance between 2010 and 2012. 
24
 According to Forbes, the use of stock options in recent years made some of the 
largest companies in the US to report extensive tax savings. These cases have been more 
pronounced in industries were stock option offerings is substantial, such as technology and 





imply a negative correlation between size and proportion of options for my 
sample period if companies give great importance to the accounting impact 
of the regulation, and if most of them are considered large companies. The 
inclusion of other components of the compensation scheme – cash 
compensation, restricted stock (RS) and long-term incentive plans (LTIP) – 
serve as a control mechanism for the alternative options shareholders have 
to deviate from option offerings. So it would be expected a negative relation 
between the proportion of options and cash compensation, RS and LTIP.  
This regression will count with two dummy variables.  The first term 
(postFAS 123R) serves as an indicator for the post-FAS 123R period. This 
variable measures the effect of FAS 123R on all firms concerning the 
proportion of options given to the CEO or Top 5 Executives. The second 
dummy, (postFAS 123R_High_Tech) is aimed at evaluating the incremental 
effect of FAS 123R for CEOs or Top 5 Executives in High-Tech companies 
in the post- period. The empirical regression is stated as follows:  
 
                                                        (1)     
 
Panel A, of Table 4, presents regression results for P_option given to 
the CEO. The coefficient in the postFAS 123R variable is negative and 
statistically significant, meaning that the proportion of options offered to the 
CEO has diminished in the post-FAS 123R for all firms. There is a 9.5 
percentage point’s decrease, on average, in the proportion of options given 
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to the CEO in the post- period. The economic significance of this result 
might be questionable. If we consider the average CEO in any firm, for my 
sample, is being offered 1,531 in current option grants, this would be 
translated in less 145 options in the post- period. The sign of the coefficient 
in the postFAS 123R_High_Tech dummy is negative and statistically 
significant, denoting that FAS 123R had a negative incremental effect of 
10.9 percentage points, in the proportion of options offered to high-tech 
companies
25
. On average, CEOs in high-tech were being offered 3,538 
options in the pre- FAS 123R period which would be translated into less 625 
options after 2005. Size appears to have a negative, but not significant, 
relation with the proportion of options, possibly due to the fact the sample 
analysed contains a lot of large public companies that foreseeing the 
accounting costs of expensing stocks have reduced them. Cash 
Compensation, RS and LTIP have a negative and significant relation with 
P_option, although the economic significance seems to be low
26
. For last, 
the sign of the constant   , (given by the designation _cons in the table) tells 
us that when the postFAS 123R dummy is equal to 0 one can expect a 
positive sign in the proportion of options of 0.517. Considering that 
postFAS 123R equal to 0 refers to the pre- FAS 123R period, this indicates 
that there is a positive and significant relation of the options offered to the 
CEO before FAS 123R approval
27
. Also, spearman’s correlation coefficient 
                                                 
25
 These facts seem to be in accordance with the initial hypothesis developed. Maybe 
foreseeing the high accounting impact that could have been occurred by maintaining the 
same level of stock options grants, high-tech firms took the initiative to reduce options 
grants. 
26
 For example, for a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of stock one would 
predict a decrease in the proportion of restricted stock to the CEO of 0.000012. 
27
 This might lead one to believe that before the introduction of FAS 123R there was a 
favourable accounting treatment towards options that made it more attractable to 





 presented in Appendix B.1.1 do not show much correlation between 
variables
29
. In addition, variance inflation tests (VIF) presented in Appendix 
B.1.2 present values between 1 and 1.5 indicating a low multicollinearity 
30
.  
Table 4 – Regression Results for proportion of options (P_option) 




t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
postFAS 123R -0.095 0.008 -11.44 0.000 -0.111 -0.078 
postFAS 
123R_High_Tech 
-0.109 0.020 -5.41 0.000 -0.149 -0.070 
Size -0.014 0.011 -1.35 0.177 -0.036 0.007 
RS -1.3E-05 2.1E-06 -6.14 0.000 -1.7E-05 -8.8E-06 
LTIP -1.2E-06 3.9E-07 -2.99 0.003 -1.9E-06 -4.0E-07 
Cash Compensation -1.7E-05 2.9E-06 -5.95 0.000 -2.3E-05 -1.2E-05 
_cons 0.517 0.076 6.82 0.000 0.368 0.666 




t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
postFAS 123R -0.077 0.006 -12.73 0.000 -0.089 -0.065 
postFAS 
123R_High_Tech 
-0.082 0.015 -5.41 0.000 -0.112 -0.053 
Size 0.000 0.008 0.04 0.966 -0.015 0.016 
RS -2.7E-05 3.3E-06 -8.11 0.000 -3.4E-05 -2.1E-05 
LTIP -1.9E-06 3.6E-07 -5.23 0.000 -2.6E-06 -1.2E-06 
Cash Compensation -3.7E-06 1.3E-06 -2.84 0.005 -6.3E-06 -1.2E-06 
_cons 0.320 0.058 5.56 0.000 0.207 0.433 
Notes. Panel A presents regression results for roughly 390 CEOs in high-tech companies. Panel B 
presents regression results for around 1,740 Top 5 Executives in high-tech companies. Data ranges 
from 2000 to 2007. Values for CEO and Top 5 Executives extracted from ExecuComp, while firm 
characteristics extracted from Compustat. The postFAS 123R dummy takes the value of 1 for the 
post-FAS 123R period for all firms in the sample and 0 otherwise. The postFAS 123R_High_Tech 
takes the value of 1 for all high-tech companies in the post-FAS 123R period and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables are described in Appendix A. Spearman Correlation and VIF tests can be found in 
Appendix: B.1.1; B.1.2; B.2.1; B.2.2. 
Panel B, of Table 4 presents regression results for Top 5 Executives for 
P_option in the post-FAS 123R period. The postFAS 123R dummy reveals 
                                                 
28
 This test is aimed at evaluating the monotonic relation between these pairs of 
control variables. 
29
 Cash Compensation appears to be significantly correlated with size with a 
coefficient of 60%. Except from this all the remaining variables appear to have a correlation 
inferior to 35%. 
30
 The rule of thumb says values inferior to 4 indicate low multicollinearity. 
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that Top 5 Executives in all firms have received less 7.7 percentage points, 
on average, in options in the post period. The postFAS 123R_High_Tech, 
indicates high-tech companies suffered an incremental negative effect of 8.2 
percentage points, in the number or options offered to Top 5 Executives 
after 2005. Despite the statistical significance, the results might have low 
economic significance. Top 5 Executives in the pre- period were receiving 
1,156 options, on average, which would mean that after FAS 123R approval 
this result would be reduced by 177 options. Size has a positive (not 
significant) relation with P_option, and surprisingly, Cash Compensation is 
positively related to P_option, as well. Also, although, the     coefficient of 
0.320 is positive, it is much lower when compared to CEOs
31
. Spearman 
correlation tests for Top 5 Executives regression (Appendix B.2.1) do not 
indicate too much relation among variables
32
. Also, with a mean VIF 
(Appendix B.2.2) of 1.18, variables appear to have a low multicollinearity.  
  
                                                 
31
 Fact, that is justifiable by previous evidence that the proportion of stock options 
received by CEOs in compensation contracts is much higher than for other executive roles 
in high-tech companies. 
32
 The highest correlation is attributed to cash compensation and size – 59.8%. 
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3.3.2 Changes in CEO and Top 5 Executives vega  
Being stock options a major driver of convexity in compensation 
contracts, I will start by analysing the changes in current risk-taking 
incentives for the post-FAS 123R period for CEOs and Top 5 Executives. 
This fixed effect regression has vegaC_opt, as the dependent variable 
that will serve as a proxy for management’s current risk-taking incentives. 
The regression presents the same dummy and control variables expressed in 
the previous analysis. However, some control variables have a different 
interpretation. As in Guay (1999) it is important to control for Size due to 
the circumstance that larger companies have a higher probability of 
adopting incentive compensation plans, such as stock option plans, which 
consequently increases vega values
33
. Also, cash compensation (salary + 
bonus) is controlled for due to the fact that the more cash compensation that 
can be invested outside the firm, the more diversified is an executive in a 
firm (Guay 1999)
34
. Restricted stock (RS) and long-term incentive plans 
(LTIP) represent alternative forms of compensation and serve as control 
variables with the same purpose as the previous regression.  
  
                                                 
33
 A positive relation between Size and vega is expected. 
34
 This fact can actually induce a positive relation between cash compensation and 
vega, due to the fact that the much diversified is an executive the more necessary to offer 
him/her a convex contract. 
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This being said the regression is empirically expressed as:  
                                                      (2)  
Table 5 present regression results for both the CEO (Panel A) and Top 
5 Executives (Panel B) on current vega. In Panel A, one can realize that the 
postFAS 123R dummy presents a negative and significant coefficient, 
meaning that in the post-FAS 123R period CEOs from all firms decreased 
their current vega. In fact, CEOs saw a decrease in convexity of $7,922 or 
15.79% in relation to annual compensation in the pre-FAS 123R period. The 
postFAS 123R_High_Tech presents an incremental negative coefficient for 
current vega, but with no statistical significance
35
. All the remaining control 
variables seem to present the expected coefficient sign. Apart from that, 
Appendix B.3.1 can tell that there is no major correlation among the 
variables of the regression
36
. The VIF analysis (Appendix B.3.2) can also 
express low correlation among variables.  
   
  
                                                 
35
 Although the industry appears to have seen an incremental decrease in convexity of 
$1,028 in the post-FAS 123R period, this result appears to be not statistically significant. 
36




Table 5 – Regression Results for current vega (VegaC_opt) 




t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
postFAS 123R -7.922 1.852 -4.28 0.000 -11.556 -4.287 
postFAS 
123R_High_Tech 
-11.703 7.220 -1.62 0.105 -25.867 2.461 
Size 9.534 3.570 2.67 0.008 2.530 16.538 
RS 0.002 0.002 0.85 0.398 -0.002 0.005 
LTIP -6.6E-05 6.9E-05 -0.95 0.343 -2.0E-04 7.0E-05 
Cash Compensation 0.001 0.003 0.4 0.686 -0.004 0.007 
_cons -35.185 25.073 -1.4 0.161 -84.377 14.007 




t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
postFAS 123R -3.046 0.952 -3.2 0.001 -4.915 -1.177 
postFAS 
123R_High_Tech 
-2.839 2.267 -1.25 0.211 -7.287 1.609 
Size 4.290 1.460 2.94 0.003 1.426 7.153 
RS 0.003 0.002 2.05 0.041 0.000 0.006 
LTIP 1.2E-04 8.4E-05 1.47 0.142 -4.1E-05 2.9E-04 
Cash Compensation 0.003 0.002 1.35 0.177 -0.001 0.008 
_cons -22.760 9.683 -2.35 0.019 -41.757 -3.763 
Notes. Panel A presents regression results for roughly 390 CEOs in high-tech companies. Panel B 
presents regression results for around 1,740 Top 5 Executives in high-tech companies. Data ranges 
from 2000 to 2007. Values for CEO and Top 5 Executives extracted from ExecuComp, while firm 
characteristics extracted from Compustat. The postFAS 123R dummy takes the value of 1 for the 
post-FAS 123R period for all firms in the sample and 0 otherwise. The postFAS 123R_High_Tech 
takes the value of 1 for all high-tech companies in the post-FAS 123R period and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables are described in Appendix A. Spearman Correlation and VIF tests can be found in 
Appendix: B.3.1; B.3.2; B.4.1; B.4.2. 
On Panel B, one can acknowledge that the effects of FAS 123R in Top 
5 Executives seem to be significant for all public listed companies or high-
tech
37
. However, Top 5 Executives in high-tech companies do not seem to 
suffer any major changes in their risk-taking incentives after FAS 123R 
approval. The postFAS 123R_High_Tech dummy presents a negative but 
                                                 
37
 By presenting a negative and significant value, the postFAS 123R dummy is telling 
us that risk-taking incentives have decreased for Top 5 Executives in all firms. As it can be 
perceptible the magnitude of this decrease is much lower when compared to the coefficient 
for CEOs: vega decreased $3,046 for Top 5 Executives after 2005, compared to $7,922 for 
CEOs. Considering CEOs receive a higher slice of their compensation in options it is 
reasonable to assume that they will be more impacted with this regulation than other top 
executives that receive more cash compensation. 
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not significant coefficient. All the remaining control variables present the 
expected signs. Correlation tests for the regression expressed in Appendix 
B.4.1 and Appendix B.4.2 present lower levels of correlation among 
variables. 
Although major changes are expected in current vega it would be 
interesting to study what happens to total vega (Vega_tot) for CEOs and 
Top 5 Executives after FAS 123R approval. To analyse this, the same 
regression is elaborated but with Vega_tot as dependent variable:  
                                                       (3) 
Table 6 presents present regression results for both the CEO (Panel A) 
and Top 5 Executives (Panel B) in relation to total vega. Panel A postFAS 
123R dummy presents a negative and significant coefficient, meaning that 
in the post-FAS 123R period CEOs from all firms decreased their total 
vegas values
38
. Opposed to this fact, the results for high-tech companies 
seem to be positive but and not statistically significant
39
. Accordingly, the 
total vega values for the Top 5 Executives in Panel B, for the postFAS 123R 
and the postFAS 123R_High_Tech dummies present significant (negative) 
and non-significant (positive) coefficients, respectively. Alongside with this, 
tests for correlation between variables (Appendix B.5.1) and VIF tests 
(Appendix B.6.2) for regressions in Table 6 present low levels of correlation 
among variables.   
  
                                                 
38
 This decrease seems quite substantial with a decrease in convexity of $25,879 in 
relation to the pre-FAS 123R period. 
39
 Although not significant the positive sign in this coefficient seems to be surprising 
according with previous assumptions.  
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Table 6 – Regression Results for total vega (Vega_tot) 




t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
postFAS 123R -25.879 7.942 -3.26 0.001 -41.460 -10.297 
postFAS 
123R_High_Tech 
16.477 17.378 0.95 0.343 -17.618 50.572 
Size 61.118 12.280 4.98 0.000 37.025 85.212 
RS -0.001 0.002 -0.45 0.651 -0.006 0.004 
LTIP 5.5E-05 2.4E-04 0.22 0.822 -4.2E-04 0.001 
Cash Compensation 0.023 0.005 4.42 0.000 0.013 0.033 
_cons -300.537 89.488 -3.36 0.001 -476.104 -124.970 




t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
postFAS 123R -6.594 2.732 -2.410 0.016 -11.953 -1.235 
postFAS 
123R_High_Tech 
3.687 5.883 0.630 0.531 -7.855 15.230 
Size 14.780 3.498 4.220 0.000 7.917 21.644 
RS 0.006 0.003 1.820 0.069 -4.3E-04 0.012 
LTIP 0.001 0.000 2.560 0.011 1.8E-04 0.001 
Cash Compensation 0.017 0.011 1.560 0.120 -0.004 0.038 
_cons -75.261 22.232 -3.390 0.001 -118.879 -31.643 
Notes. Panel A presents regression results for roughly 390 CEOs in high-tech companies. Panel B 
presents regression results for around 1,740 Top 5 Executives in high-tech companies. Data ranges 
from 2000 to 2007. Values for CEO and Top 5 Executives extracted from ExecuComp, while firm 
characteristics extracted from Compustat. The postFAS 123R dummy takes the value of 1 for the 
post-FAS 123R period for all firms in the sample and 0 otherwise. The postFAS 123R_High_Tech 
takes the value of 1 for all high-tech companies in the post-FAS 123R period and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables are described in Appendix A. Spearman Correlation and VIF tests can be found in 






Chapter 4 – Small Sample Analysis 
4.1 Objectives and sample description 
On the large sample analysis one was able to realize that FAS 123R 
might have contributed to alter the status quo in executive compensation, 
especially in what regards to stock option attribution in high-tech firms. 
However, the previous data analysis was majorly focused in high-level 
executive pay disregarding the effects of FAS 123R in lower hierarchical 
levels of the labour market. It seems important to understand if any changes 
occurred in the compensation structure of those lower level employees that 
do not have any executive role but are granted with options in their 
compensation contracts. Although one must bear in mind that options have 
great importance at high hierarchical levels, especially due to their risk-
taking incentive, the high-tech sector is remarkably known for offering 
options and other equity grants, to other employees. This fact not only 
contributes to create a certain identity with the firm but also motivates 
bottom line employees to have a risk-taking mind-set necessary to succeed 
in the industry.    
I believe that a deeper analysis of high-tech companies’ annual reports 
and proxy statements can provide a more detailed description of the sector’s 
response towards FAS 123R issuance. With this in mind in this small 
sample analysis I am intended to study the evolution of non-executive 
employee compensation of 10 high-tech US firms from 2002 to 2007
40
. This 
                                                 
40
 For comparison reasons the time horizon resembles to the same mentioned in the 
large sample analysis.  
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analysis will not only focus on the quantitative aspect of the changes (if any) 
in the number of stock options offers, but will also try to understand the 
major initiatives taken by high-tech companies in response to FAS 123R.  
Table 7 presents the list of companies analysed in this sample with the 
respective year in which they stated implementing FAS 123R ruling. As it 
can be perceptible there are no early adopters in this sample, meaning that 
all the companies analysed have only complied with stock option expensing 
in the beginning of 2006 (mandatory date by law).  
Table 7 – Companies for small sample analysis 
Company Name: Fiscal Year of FAS 123 R adoption: 
Adobe Systems Inc. 2006 
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. 2006 
Cisco Systems Inc.  2006 
Dell Inc. 2006 
Electronic Arts Inc. 2006 
Hewlett Packard Co. 2006 
Intel Corp. 2006 
Qualcomm Inc. 2006 
SPSS Inc. 2006 
Texas Instruments Inc. 2006 
Notes. List of high-tech companies that make part of the small sample analysis in relation to non-
executive employee stock options offer. All the companies presented are given by the dummy 
variable High_tech created for the Large Sample that includes the group of US companies that 
belong to the high-tech sector. 
4.2 Major adjustments to stock options expensing      
A detailed analysis of this companies’ proxy statements can lead one to 
realize that FAS 123R introduced some changes in the structure and content 
regarding executive compensation disclosures. A common pattern was that 
some companies decision to change their method of valuating stock options 
upon FAS 123R adoption. For example, in its 2008 proxy statement 
Qualcomm Inc. stated it would pass from a Black-Scholes valuation model 
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of stock options to a “lattice binomial option-pricing model”. This 
represents a positive change for a better precision in pricing options at 
certain points in time. Although both the Black-Scholes and Binomial 
models have the same theoretical foundations
41
, the Black-Scholes model 
presents a major disadvantage towards stock option valuation that is more 
emphasized in the case of US companies: the Black-Scholes model cannot 
be used to precisely calculate the price of options that have an American-
style exercise period
42
, because it only calculates the option price at one 
point in time, which is the date the option expires. As one can realize, each 
year several employees, from the CEO to other management positions, 
exercise their options before its expiration date. Meaning that with a 
binomial valuation approach one can accurately state the price of the option 
at its exercise date and avoid a deterioration of its value that otherwise 
would be lost by using the Black-Scholes model
43
. This represents a good 
approach towards a fair valuation of options as a compensation expense for 
companies.      
Another relevant aspect is the change in the eligibility criteria regarding 
stock options offerings. In its 2005 proxy statement Cisco Systems Inc. 
approved the new 2005 Stock Initiative Plan (to substitute the for the 
previous 1996 Stock Incentive Plan) clearly stating that Cisco will no longer 
                                                 
41
 To state an example both the Black-Scholes model and the Binomial model have 
the same geometric Brownian motion theory of stock price behaviour and risk-neutral 
valuation.  
42
 American and European options have major difference regarding its exercise date. 
Generically speaking American options can be exercised at any point in time, while 
European options can only be exercise at its expiration date.   
43
 It is important to state that there is an exception surrounding this line of reasoning: 
if an investor buys an American call option this option will have the same value as a 
European call option. The reason behind this is that there seems to be no advantage in 
exercising the American call option before its expiration date, it is always better to wait and 
see how the market evolves.  
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automatically renew its stock option compensation granted each year to its 
non-employee executives. Instead, the company will start offering 
discretionary awards that follow specific criteria settled at Board Meetings. 
Similar to this practice, in its 2007 proxy statement Qualcomm Inc. stated 
that in light of the introduction of FAS 123R it would replace its 
combination of stock option awards and consequent renewal “with a single 
annual award prorated in the first year of a director’s service”. This might 
contribute to strategically grant option awards to those who have good 
performance indicators and decrease the annual expenses associated with 
automatic grants. Also, under its Internal Revenue Code (Section 162m) 
Cisco states that “all stock options must be granted with an exercise price 
not less than 100% of fair market value” – contrasting with past practices 
where grants with an exercise price of 80% of fair market value were 
allowed.   
An alternative tendency was also the decision of companies of start 
granting restricted stock units
44
 (RSUs) instead of options grants only. SPSS 
Inc. compensation committee ruled in its 2007 proxy that the move from 
option grants to RSUs seemed to be motivated by the fact “that public 
companies in general have begun to grants RSUs instead of options grants”. 
In some cases companies even changed to a compensation structure based 
on a mix of option awards and RSUs which is the case of Advanced Micro 
                                                 
44
 Restricted Stock Units represent a compensation mechanism composed by a 
companies’ stock. The particularity in RSUs is that the employee does not receive all the 
stock in one moment in time, but in conformity with a vesting plan that is dependent on 
performance indicators achieved (or not) by the employee. Also, RSUs involve a certain 
commitment of the employee with the institution to which he/she is working for, because 
the employer is only eligible to receive them upon reaching a certain length of time with the 
company (Hull, John C., "Options Futures and other Derivatives." Prentice-Hall 
International, Inc 5 (2000): 275-292).    
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Devices Inc. as stated in its 2006 proxy statement. As discussed earlier 
RSUs are also fundamental to maintain the incentive levels of employees by 
providing them stock gradually according with the company performance. 
At the same time they work as an alternative instrument to avoid the use of 
stock options (sometimes considered excessive) and its negative 
consequences in the income statement brought by FAS 123R.  
4.3 Stock options to non-named paid executives and employees 
After generally reviewing the major structural changes observed in 
proxy statements it is time to analyse the number of stock options offered to 
other employees below the CEO and Top 5 named paid executives. Figure 1 
illustrates the evolution of stock options majorly offered to non-named 
executives and employees for the 10 US high-tech companies analysed. 
Except from Qualcomm Inc. and Electronic Arts Inc. all the remaining 8 
companies reduced the number of stock options offered in 2007 comparing 
with 2002 values. For example, Dell Inc. offered to their non-named 
executives and employees less 60% of stock options in 2007 reducing from 
a value of 109,142,046 to 43,661,288. In fact, the company clearly states in 
its 2003 proxy statement that foreseeing the upcoming events with the 
approval of stock options expensing the company wants to start an action 
programme to reduce its dependence of options use as a compensation 
component. Also, from 2006 onwards, half of the companies started offering 
a mix of stock options and RSUs which makes it not only difficult to assess 
the number of options offered but also confirms some tendency to move 






























Fiscal Year End 
Stock Options Evolution 
Adobe Systems Inc. Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
Cisco Systems Inc. Dell Inc.
Electronic Arts Inc. Hewlett Packard
Intel Corp. Qualcomm Inc.
Texas Instruments Inc. SPSS
Notes. Evolution of stock options offering to non-named executives and employees for 10 US high-
tech firms from 2002 to 2007 fiscal year. The number of options was calculated by deducting the 
number of options offered to top named executives from the total number of options offered each year. 
The number of stock options offered by Intel Inc. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc. for 2006 and 2007 
are not stated because both companies use a combination of RSUs and stock options without stating the 
separate values for each component. The number of stock options offered by SPSS Inc., Electronic Arts 
Inc. and Hewlett Packard Co. for 2006 and 2007 are not stated because both companies use a 
combination of RSUs and stock options without stating the separate values for each component. All the 
values stated in this figure were extracted from firms’ proxy statements between 2002 and 2008. All the 
values presented in this graph can be found in Appendix D.1. 
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Total Options Offer 
Non-named executives and
employees options offer
Figure 2 – Total stock options offer 2002, 2006 
To get a better perspective on this, Figure 2 illustrates the total amount 
of stock options offered in 2002 and 2006 to non-named executives. As it 
can be perceptible the number of options offered is almost reduced to half, 
from around 697 million to 361 million.  
Broadly speaking, one could say that amid the approval of FAS 123R 
the 10 US high-tech companies have reduced their usage of stock options as 
a compensation mechanism to non-executive employees. If one considers 
that FAS 123R became mandatory in 2006 for all public companies this fact 
gains even more relevance. I believe one of the most sounding examples 
that illustrate this is related to Microsoft Corp
45
. In fiscal year 2004 
Microsoft Corp. announced in its annual report of 2005 that it would initiate 
                                                 
45
 Microsoft Corp. does not make part of my small sample of 10 US high-tech 
companies. Still, I decided to mention this case considering the relevance of this example to 
the object of study of this dissertation.  
Notes. Total number of options offered to non-named employees for 10 US high-tech firms in 2002 
and 2006. The number of options offered in 2006 for Intel Inc. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc. is 
not accounted because both these companies have a bundle package of options and RSUs that is only 
stated in the 2006 proxy statements as a total amount. 
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an “employee stock option transfer programme” stating that all employees 
could transfer their vested and unvested stock options to JP Morgan “with a 
strike price of $33 or higher”. This was not only a possibility of taking 
thousands of options of the hands of their employees and avoid a substantial 
expenses in the income statement, but also a motivation for the majority of 
the employees that were stuck with options with no value due to 
unfavourable events in the stock market. In fact, as Conyon (2014) reports, 
from 2000 onwards US public companies started to put “more emphasis on 
grants of restricted stock as opposed to stock options”. According with the 
author the amount of stock options as diminished from 42% of total pay in 
2001 to 14% in 2012. Contrasting to this restricted stock has pulled from 
about 6% of total pay in 2001 to 35% in 2012. Also, according with 
Choudhary et al. (2009) several companies between 2004 and 2005 
accelerated the vesting of employee stock options in the upcoming event of 
FAS 123R approval. This procedure would avoid the foreseeable losses in 
the income statement that would be incurred with stock options expensing 
and potentially avoid downgrades in financial analyst’s recommendations. 
All these moves can lead one to consider that in accordance with proponents 
of FAS 123R approval, stock options were being excessively used due to 
their reporting advantages. Although valuing options might sound tricky, 
academics and investors insisted in the idea that stock options are an 
expense, and therefore must be accounted as such in the income statement. 
One of the major proponents was Warren Buffett that once proclaimed: “If 
stock options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation 
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isn't an expense, what is it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the 
calculation of earnings, where in the world do they go?”
46
     
4.4 Stock options to non-employee directors  
Apart from the cash component given to the non-employees directors’ 
group for attending board meeting or taking conference calls, shareholders 
usually try to maintain a certain level of incentive alignment by rewarding 
them with stock options (and also stock). For this group, equity 
compensation becomes also important, so directors feel themselves 
incentivized to put their best judgment and effort to every single business 
decision. Out of the 10 high-tech companies in my sample, 6 of them have a 
pronounced tendency to reward their non-employee directors with stock 
options. To understand how options granting to non-employee directors has 
evolved before and after FAS 123R approval, I analyse the level of stock 
options granted to this group from 2002 to 2006 for this 6 high-tech 
companies.  
  
                                                 
46

























Figure 3 presents non-employees director’s stock option offers from 
2002 to 2006:  
As it can be observed in Figure 3, except from Dell Inc. that has 
diminished almost 80% the level of stock options offered from 2002 
(286,128 options) to 2006 (58,273 options), all the other high-tech 
companies seem to have increase the amount of stock offered to non-
employee directors. This fact seems to contradict the tendency observed in 
the previous analysis regarding stock options offerings to non-named 
executives and employees. As mentioned earlier in this chapter although 
these high-techs are granting more options to their non-employee directors, 
they are no longer granting automatic grants. Instead, from 2005 onwards 
grants at Cisco Systems Inc., Intel Corp. and Qualcomm Inc. are given 
according with objectives achieved by the board and company performance. 
  
Figure 3 – Non-employee directors’ stock options 2002-06 
Notes. All the numbers stated in the figure were taken from firms proxy statements from 2002 to 
2006. Appendix D.2 states in detail the number of option for each company.  
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4.5 Main takeaways 
Overall, employee stock options seem to have decreased motivated by 
FAS 123R. Still it is important to scrutinize some particular cases on my 
sample to understand the environment in which companies were operating. 
From the graph in Figure 1 the cases of Cisco System Inc. and Dell Inc. are 
worth mention due to the magnitude in decrease of options. Although aware 
of the advantages of stock options
47
 Cisco was severely penalized in profits 
with FAS 123R. Between 2002 and 2006 the impact of FAS 123R has been 
quite severe on net income. Table 8 depicts the impact on net impact with 
stock options expensing after adjustments from 2001 to 2006: 
Table 8 – Cisco Systems Inc. impact on net income FAS 123R 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Impact on net income with pro 
forma FAS 123R ($ millions) 
-1.691 -1.520 -1.259 -1.215 -1.034 0.756 
Notes. Impact on net income with pro forma FAS 123R is calculated by taking the difference 
between the reported Net Incomce and Operating compensation expenses, net of tax. Values for this 
calculatin were extracted from Poitras, G. (xxxx) ‘Accounting standards for employee stock option 
disclosure’, Int. J. Business Governance and Ethics, Vol. X, No. Y, pp.000–000 
   This can be the main reason behind the decrease in option usage 
expressed in Figure 1. And once again as Hayes et al. (2012) theory 
confirms, the decline in options usage is more pronounced in companies 
with higher accounting impact.  
On the other hand Dell Inc. case can also provide an interesting 
perspective. The company settled a strategy in 1996
48
 of speculation in the 
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 The advantages mainly refer to risk-taking incentives mentioned in Chapter 2 – 
Literature Review. 
48





options market in its own stock: it was buying call options
49
 and selling put 
options
50
 at the same time. The combination strategy was favourable when 
the stock price was increasing and unfavourable otherwise. This worked for 
a couple of years, but in 2001 Dell Inc. was prosecuted for an accounting 
fraud that last until 2006
51
. By this time the stock price started falling 
reaching half the price – from $40.52 in August 2005 to $21.65 in August 
2006
52
 – which forced Dell to exercise the put options by buying stock for 
much more than the stock was valued. This fact added to the approval of 
options expensing with FAS 123R forced to company to leave away from 
options and increase the amount of restricted stock offered. Using options in 
excess is in fact one the reasons behind the accounting fraud. Since Dell 
executives were receiving more than half of their wealth in options they 
would profit more if the stock price would go up. To make this happen, for 
several years management recommended several stock repurchase programs 
that would increase stock price rather than distributing a dividend to 
shareholders. Especially when the stock price was rising. This example can 
lead one to think if options settle the right risk-taking incentives. Also, it 
leaves space for reflection of the extent to which options were being used in 
excess due to their favourable accounting treatment.                              
 
                                                 
49
 Buying a call option gives you the right, but not the obligation to buy a share at 
fixed price for a certain period of time.  
50
 Selling a put option mandates the seller to buy back the shares at a pre-set price for 
a certain period of time. 
51
 In general terms the company pumped up profits because it was accepting 
undisclosed payments for Intel. For more information about the case see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/business/23dell.html 
52
 The prices for Dell Inc. share were obtained by consulting historic share prices on 
Google Finance.  
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion and further remarks 
The general overview that one could take from the large sample 
analysis is that although the proportion of stock options have significantly 
diminished in high-tech firms for CEOs and Top 5 Executives, the vega for 
this industry do not present (surprisingly) significant changes. In other 
words one could say that even though stock options where being less used, 
risk-taking incentives do not seem to be affected significantly. Considering 
that this fact contradicts the initial hypothesis, I have conducted further 
research through the observations of selective high-tech annual reports and 
proxy statements in the hopes of reaching a more elucidative perspective 
about the behaviour of companies surrounding this event. A first guess on 
why the vega values remain steady while the number of options offered 
decreases would go for the fact that high-tech companies have substituted 
stock options for other compensation mechanisms that maintain great risk-
taking incentives. Annual reports and proxy statements from 2002 to 2007 
of some of the major high-tech firms in the US seem to indicate that these 
companies started offering to CEOs and Top 5 Executives a mix of options 
and RSUs. Companies such as Intel Corp. or Hewlett Packard Co. have 
followed this path
53
. Also, Microsoft announced in its 2003 proxy statement 
that it would stop granting options and it would start increasing its grants of 
restricted stock. Although it is understandable that RSUs don’t have the 
same effect as options, they might create a good incentive on high-tech 
employees that want to remain in the firm in the long-term, to preserve a 
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 In their annual proxy statements of 2006 Intel Corp. and Hewlett Packard Co. have 
stated that that from 2006 onwards their executives will have a more performance oriented 
compensation with the introduction of RSUs. 
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risk-taking attitude in order to value the companies’ stock and get the most 
benefit out of it. Alternatively, some academics argue that indexed options 
and performance options are good alternative mechanisms for companies 
that are more dependent on options to preserve risk-taking incentives. In 
addition, these alternatives assure that executives are not rewarded only 
because the market evolved in a favourable tendency, but because they had 
the right risk-taking mentality
54
.  
Although I was not able to find any factual evidence on this I believe 
companies might have pondered other ideas that would be more external to 
the company in order to keep compensating employees with options. For 
example, high-tech companies could have pondered to issue their options to 
a third party – meaning an underwriter such as an investment bank (e.g. JP 
Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs) – and pay employees with the money 
received from those options
55
. To sum up because there are several 
alternative methods to maintain vega and consequently convexity in a 
compensation contract, the results obtained for the regressions on current 
and total  vega do not seem to be a expressive as I initially predicted in the 
development of my hypothesis. Both CEOs and Top 5 Executives in high-
tech might have started to receive less options grants as the large sample 
suggests. But it would be to naïve to consider that high-tech companies 
                                                 
54
 In the upcoming events of FAS 123R approval and its consequences on the high-
tech US industry several authors such as Zvi Bodie, Robert S. Kaplan, and Robert C. 
Merton recommended high-tech companies to substitute stock options with other 
mechanisms. Index options and performance options are the most suggested mechanisms.   
55
 Zvi Bodie, Robert S. Kaplan, and Robert C. Merton argue in favour of this strategy 
even considering that the market might put a higher value on options than the employees 
actually do. This could even mean that companies could end up with more cash available. 
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would remain passive with such changes in regulation that could arm their 
business. 
Following the same tendency as in the large sample analysis, I was able 
to realize that non-named executives and employees have seen their level of 
option grants diminishing with FAS 123R. The small sample analysis made 
it clear that option usage at employee level as also decrease for half the its 
value when comparing 2002 with 2006. Except from this it was interesting 
to understand how high-tech companies have adapt to stock options 
expensing with the introduction of RSUs and by progressing to a binomial 
option pricing model. For last, the tendency of decrease in stock option 
usage was broken by analysing the evolution of option grants to non-
employee directors. With no relevant ties to the company I believe options 
serve as an important mechanism for incentive alignment in this group.  
   I cannot fail to point out that the magnitude of my results might be 
affected by the time period chosen for the analysis. Still, as I mentioned 
previously, for the sake of interpretation I am confident this was the best 
time period for analysis purposes. Though, it would be interesting for 
further research to extend the analysis in the years to come to extract more 
meaningful results in the consequences of stock option expensing to the 
high-tech industry. Possibly this would lead us to a more elucidative 
conclusion on why has vega does not seem to be significantly affected with 





Appendix A – Variables Definition 
 
Variable Database Type Units Description 
P_salary ExecuComp Num % 
salary valued in dollars divided by 
the value of total compensation in 
dollars that includes cash 
compensation, long-term incentive 
plans, restricted stock and stock 
options 
P_bonus ExecuComp Num % 
bonus valued in dollars divided by 
the value of total compensation in 
dollars that includes cash 
compensation, long-term incentive 
plans, restricted stock and stock 
options 
P_option ExecuComp Num % 
stock options valued in dollars 
divided by the value of total 
compensation in dollars that 
includes cash compensation, long-
term incentive plans, restricted 
stock and stock options 
P_RS ExecuComp Num % 
restricted stock valued in dollars 
divided by the value of total 
compensation in dollars that 
includes cash compensation, long-
term incentive plans, restricted 
stock and stock options 
P_LTIP ExecuComp Num % 
long-term incentive plans valued in 
dollars divided by the value of 
total compensation in dollars that 
includes cash compensation, long-
term incentive plans, restricted 
stock and stock options 
VegaC_opt ExecuComp Num 
$ 
thousands 
aggregate option vega of an 
executives arising from current 
equity grants. Measured as the 
dollar change in current equity-
based compensation per 0.01 
change in stock price volatility 




aggregate option vega of an 
executives arising from overall 
equity grants (current and past). 
Measured as the dollar change in 
the overall equity-based 
compensation per 1% change in 
stock price volatility 
Num_Option_c ExecuComp Num thousands 




(cont.)     
Size Compustat Num log(at) logarithmic value of total assets 
RD/TA Compustat Num % 
total R&D expenses divided by 
total assets: xrd/at 
MTB Compustat Num % 
market value of equity + liabilities) 
/ book value of total assets: (prcc_f 
* csho + lt) / at 
CAPEX/TA Compustat Num % 
capital expenditures divided by 
total assets: capx / at 
ROA Compustat Num % return on assets: oibdp / at 
postFAS 123R N/A - - 
equal to 1 for the post-FAS 123R 
period (defined from January, 2006 




N/A - - 
equal to 1 for High-Tech firms in 
the post-FAS 123R period 
Cash 
Compensation 
Compustat Num $  salary + bonus 
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Appendix B – Additional tests to Large Sample regression results  
 
Appendix B.1.1 – Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test for 




















-0.0233 0.3016 1 
    
Size 0.0740 0.1092 -0.0274 1 
   
RS -0.1645 0.2786 0.0574 0.3388 1 
  
LTIP -0.1223 0.1963 -0.0164 0.3326 0.3218 1 
 
Cash Comp. 0.0537 -0.2056 -0.1667 0.6000 0.2003 0.2084 1 
 
Appendix B.1.2 – Variance Inflation Factor test for for regression in 
Table 4 Panel A 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.36 0.736795 
Cash Compensation 1.26 0.79576 
postFAS 123R 1.17 0.854954 
RS 1.16 0.863411 
postFAS 123R_High_Tech 1.11 0.904872 
LTIP 1.03 0.966252 






Appendix B.2.1 – Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test for 




















0.0018 0.3080 1 
    
Size 0.0738 0.0886 -0.0266 1 
   
RS -0.0877 0.2607 0.0730 0.3373 1 
  




0.1565 -0.1479 -0.0964 0.5982 0.2311 0.2107 1 
 
Appendix B.2.2 – Variance Inflation Factor test for regression in 
Table 4 Panel B 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.31 0.761705 
Cash Compensation 1.26 0.793144 
RS 1.2 0.833713 
postFAS 123R 1.16 0.864778 
postFAS 123R_High_Tech 1.12 0.894491 
LTIP 1.03 0.972478 






Appendix B.3.1 - Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test for 




















-0.0369 0.3019 1 
    
Size 0.3984 0.1087 -0.028 1 
   
RS 0.1163 0.2776 0.0564 0.3397 1 
  
LTIP 0.1235 0.1957 -0.0169 0.3330 0.3223 1 
 
Cash Comp 0.3558 -0.2059 -0.1675 0.6011 0.2022 0.2095 1 
 
Appendix B.3.2 – Variance Inflation Factor test for regression in 
Table 5 Panel A 
Variable         VIF 1/VIF   
Size 1.36 0.736258 
Cash Compensation 1.26 0.795063 
postFAS 123R 1.17 0.854792 
RS 1.16 0.863333 
postFAS 123R_High_Tech 1.11 0.904639 
LTIP 1.03 0.966238 






Appendix B.4.1 – Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test for 




















0.0044 0.3083 1 
    
Size 0.3051 0.0884 -0.0271 1 
   
RS 0.1163 0.2602 0.0722 0.3374 1 
  




0.3677 -0.1484 -0.0974 0.5982 0.2318 0.2110 1 
 
Appendix B.4.2 – Variance Inflation Factor test for regression in 
Table 5 Panel B 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.31 0.761659 
Cash Compensation 1.26 0.792948 
RS 1.20 0.833757 
postFAS 123R 1.16 0.864627 
postFAS 123R_High_Tech 1.12 0.894325 
LTIP 1.03 0.972477 






Appendix B.5.1 – Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test for 




















0.0497 0.3019 1 
    
Size 0.5757 0.1087 -0.028 1 
   
RS 0.1709 0.2776 0.0564 0.3397 1 
  
LTIP 0.1803 0.1957 -0.0169 0.333 0.3223 1 
 
Cash Comp 0.4985 -0.2059 -0.1675 0.6011 0.2022 0.2095 1 
 
Appendix B.5.2 – Variance Inflation Factor test for regression in 
Table 6 Panel A 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.36 0.736258 
Cash Compensation 1.26 0.795063 
postFAS 123R 1.17 0.854792 
RS 1.16 0.863333 
postFAS123R_High_Tech 1.11 0.904639 
LTIP 1.03 0.966238 






Appendix B.6.1 – Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test for 




















0.0623 0.3083 1 
    
Size 0.4037 0.0884 -0.0271 1 
   
RS 0.1829 0.2602 0.0722 0.3374 1 
  
LTIP 0.2115 0.1866 -0.015 0.2927 0.3153 1 
 
Cash Comp 0.5043 -0.1484 -0.0974 0.5982 0.2318 0.211 1 
 
Appendix B.6.2 – Variance Inflation Factor test for regression in 
Table 6 Panel B 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.31 0.761659 
Cash Compensation 1.26 0.792948 
RS 1.2 0.833757 
postFAS 123R 1.16 0.864627 
postFAS 123R_High_Tech 1.12 0.894325 
LTIP 1.03 0.972477 






Appendix C – Explaining Fixed Effects Regression 
My regression resembles a basic regression framework expressed as: 
                                                                                            (4) 
I am interested in the relation between x and y in the extent that I am 
trying to understand if Δx “causes” Δy. This represents the basic framework 
for an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) that has the following 
assumption: there is a random sample of observations on y and x; there is a 
mean zero error term (E(ԑ) = 0); there is no linear relationship among the 
explanatory variables (i.e. no perfect collinearity); and the error term, ԑ has 
an expected value of 0 given any values of the explanatory variable 
(E(ԑ│  ) = 0 ; for i = 1,…, k (zero conditional mean).  
Bearing this in mind I assume that the error expressed as, ԑ is divided in 
two parts: 
                                                                                                  (5)   
where,   represents an unobserved fixed effect, once I suppose that 
there is a factor in my regression that I cannot observe and that influences 
the regression that I am trying to study
56
. On my view it would be too much 
“optimistic” to expect a perfect cause and effect relation strictly linear 
between my dependent variable y and my independent variable x without 
the interference of any other factor (e.g. decline in high-tech sector).  
  
                                                 
56
 In this case I am assuming that there some external influence that for example is 
related with the use of stock options and a certain period of time rather than the regulation 
FAS 123R (the main target of my study).  
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Still, the main question here is to understand into what extent is the 
“unobserved factor”,   correlated with   which in my regression is 
represented by postFAS 123R. So if: 
     (    )   , this is referred to as “random effect”. In 
this case endogeneity is not a problem. Since   makes part 
of the error term,   the error is always correlated with the 
regression in any moment in time. A random effects 
regression can be used.  
     (    )   , this is referred to as “fixed effects”. In 
this case endogeneity is a problem and a fixed effects 
regression should be used.  
In order to understand if     (    ) is equal or different from 0 I have 
used the Hausman Test
57
 where my null hypothesis H0 is:  
         (    )    
         (    )    
The formula for the Hausman test is defined as: 
  
[(    ) (    )]
 
[(       ) (       )] 
                                                                  (5) 
 where,      is the estimator for    in the fixed effects regression; 
     is the estimator for     in the random effects regression;         is 
the variance for    in the fixed effects regression;         is the variance 
for    in the random effects regression. 
                                                 
57
 The Hausman test is mainly used to decide whether a fixed effects or random 
effects regression is appropriate.    
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By doing the fixed and random effects regressions having the 
proportion of options (P_option) and current (VegaC_opt) and total vega 
(Vega_tot) as independent variables, I have calculated the hausman 
coefficient for each one of the regressions. The coefficients obtained were 
all different from 0. This mean that I should reject the null hyphotesis H0 
and run a fixed effects regression for all the sample tests. For example, W = 
10.95 for the fixed effects regression with P_options has the dependent 
variable. By rejecting H0 I am aware that it is better to perform a fixed 






Appendix D – Small Sample Analysis data 
 
Appendix D. 1 – Stock Option Evolution illustrated in Figure 1. All the 
values presented were extracted from companies’ proxy statements 
information from 2002 to 2008  
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cisco 
Systems Inc. 
271,684,407 188,514,686 185,719,925 225,437,680 196,515,555 182,506,000 
Qualcomm 
Inc. 




33,683,904 50,204,492 27,763,703 21,827,273 19,640,300 18,604,600 
Dell Inc. 109,142,047 82,399,883 49,098,052 49,224,138 43,577,586 43,661,288 







9,340,417 4,789,601 9,443,664 10,019,102 9,665,026 4,676,483 
Hewlett 
Packard Co. 




















Appendix D. 2 –Stock options offered to non-employee directors from 
2002 to 20006 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cisco Systems Inc. 150,000 150,000 190,000 230,000 210,000 
Qualcomm Inc. 120,000 110,000 220,000 202,000 278,000 
Texas Instruments Inc. 90,000 135,000 180,000 150,000 150,000 
Dell Inc. 286,128 311,560 129,560 64,993 58,273 
Intel Corp. 120,000 162,500 125,000 167,000 150,000 
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Adobe Systems Inc. 7273 Form DEF 14 A 28/02/2002 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Adobe Systems Inc. 7273 Form DEF 14 A 17/03/2003 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Adobe Systems Inc. 7273 Form DEF 14 A 12/03/2004 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Adobe Systems Inc. 7273 Form DEF 14 A 14/03/2005 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Adobe Systems Inc. 7273 Form DEF 14 A 24/02/2006 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 






























3674 Form DEF 14 A 15/03/2007 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Cisco Systems Inc. 3576 Form DEF 14 A 03/10/2002 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Cisco Systems Inc. 3576 Form DEF 14 A 18/09/2003 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Cisco Systems Inc. 3576 Form DEF 14 A 28/09/2004 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Cisco Systems Inc. 3576 Form DEF 14 A 26/09/2005 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Cisco Systems Inc. 3576 Form DEF 14 A 25/09/2006 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Cisco Systems Inc. 3576 Form DEF 14 A 26/09/2007 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Dell Inc. 3571 Form DEF 14 A 29/05/2002 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Dell Inc. 3571 Form DEF 14 A 30/05/2003 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Dell Inc. 3571 Form DEF 14 A 27/05/2004 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 







Dell Inc. 3571 Form DEF 14 A 05/06/2006 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Dell Inc. 3571 Form DEF 14 A 31/10/2007 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Electronic Arts Inc. 7372 Form DEF 14 A 28/06/2002 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Electronic Arts Inc. 7372 Form DEF 14 A 30/06/2003 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Electronic Arts Inc. 7372 Form DEF 14 A 28/06/2004 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Electronic Arts Inc. 7372 Form DEF 14 A 24/06/2005 
Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
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Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
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Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
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Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
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Edgar – 
www.sec.gv 
Intel Corp. 3674 Form DEF 14 A 02/04/2003 
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www.sec.gv 
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  (continued)   
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